Makes the case for abandoning the phrase ‘fake news’, and ‘post-truth’. I give three arguments for abandonment: that these terms are linguistically defective, that they are unnecessary given the rich vocabulary we already have, and that they are tools for authoritarian and reactionary propaganda. If I’d known about the phrase before, I’d have said that this paper makes the case for semantic no platforming (h/t Liam Bright).
What’s the point of knowing how? forthcoming in the European Journal of Philosophy [pre-print]
Why do we think and talk about knowledge-how? Using Edward Craig’s genealogical approach to knowledge, this paper argues that there are two reasons: one concerning spreading capacities, and the other concerning mutual reliance. These functions are in tension, making the concept of knowledge-how in tension. To resolve the tension, we’d better endorse a revisionary account of knowledge-how.
Argues for a novel theory of knowledge-how as a distinctive kind of ability to answer a question, what I call an ability to answer a question on the fly. One can think of this view as a kind of compromise between Intellectualism and Anti-Intellectualism, that combines the idea that knowledge-how is an ability, with the standard question-based semantics for interrogative complements (like ‘how to swim’).
I argue that Intellectualists ought to provide us with an account of the generality of the methods that figure in the propositions which they claim are involved in knowledge-how, that this problem is analogous to the Generality Problem for reliabilism, and that lots of prima facie plausible ways to give an account of the generality of these methods fail (This paper is basically a longer and much less amusing version of this sketch).
This paper centres around cases for knowledge-how that are analogous to Lackey’s Creationist teacher, using them to criticise the knowledge-how norm on showing (roughly, the norm that one must know how to do what one teaches others to do). A central example is Carmine Caruso, who is a super cool person to think and know about.
Makes the case for an epistemic norm on intending(roughly: that one must know how to do what one intends to do), based on extensions of arguments used in favour of other epistemic norms.
Argues that treating the ‘how to swim’ in the sentence ‘Jane knows how to swim’ as a free relative (rather than as an interrogative) is linguistically implausible, and that this causes a problem for Bengson and Moffett’s Objectualist account of knowledge-how.